Insider Threat Analyst ; Counterintelligence Analyst

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Would you like to become an insider threat professional? Are you interested in joining a dedicated team of counterintelligence/insider threat professionals helping to safeguard Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)? If you answered "Yes" to these questions, we invite you to learn more about our opening for an Insider Threat (IT) Data Analyst. The mid‑level IT Insider Threat Data Analyst assists the senior IT Data/Cyber Analyst and IT Team Leader in conducting Counterintelligence and IT‑related activities and analysis to assess threats to LANL and national security posed by covert or overt activities of LANL personnel or foreign entities.

The IT Data Analyst also assists with a diverse range of analytical products and support, including providing expertise to multiple members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) and other government agencies. Local analytical assistance efforts will support national insider threat goals and objectives as directed by the LANL Foreign Immigration, Visits and Analysis (FVA) Group Leader and Office of Counterintelligence (OCI) Director.

The IT Data Analyst will be responsible for assisting with the development of all source strategic and tactical research, analysis and writing, to include the production of finished assessments and raw reports. In addition, assisting and supporting the development of tailor‑made operations and insider threat analytical tools and assisting with the collection, analysis, and documentation of information pertinent to insider threat related matters and insider threat awareness briefings will be expected.

Contributing to due diligence efforts and collaborating across OCI components, with other components of the LANL Field Intelligence Element (FIE), and with other LANL personnel as appropriate will also be required of the position. Aiding in the development of extensive collaborations with Associate Laboratory Director for Defense Protection personnel, DOE IN, other DOE Counterintelligence and Insider Threat Field Offices, and extensive liaison with the FBI and other USIC members, to include assisting OCI personnel on various working groups and the planning and organizing of a local IT working group, will also be expected.

Finally, assisting other OCI personnel with intelligence and insider threat briefings/presentations to laboratory personnel and DOE seniors which may inform/impact DOE policy throughout the department will be required.

• Some insider threat program development experience and familiarity with relevant insider threat community policy (e.g., EO 13587, DOE O 470.5) and an understanding of insider threat indicators, organizations, and roles.
• Demonstrated vocational ethic that supports a commitment to excellence, continuous learning, and semi‑independent work. Experience with supporting analytical projects and assisting with analytical services and demonstrated experience with intelligence and insider threat analysis methods. An understanding of current global political, economic, social, cultural, scientific, fiscal, and military conditions to accurately evaluate information is also a prerequisite.
• Demonstrated experience assisting in the development of intelligence and/or insider threat briefings to decision makers at all levels.
• Demonstrated ability to foster teamwork and interact professionally across LANL, with DOE IN, with other DOE Counterintelligence and Insider Threat Field Offices and with liaison partners. Willing to occasionally represent OCI on various working groups and possess strong literary skills and clarity of speech.
• Position requires a bachelor's degree and a minimum of five years of related experience, or an equivalent combination of education and experience.
• Familiarity with the DOE Insider Threat Program and insider threat professional certifications are a plus. Acquire certification as soon as feasible if not already possessed.
• Familiarity with the DOE Counterintelligence/Counter terrorism Program and knowledge of foreign intelligence service methods and of non‑traditional foreign intelligence collection are also a plus.
• Competitive…